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ABSTRACT   
The US Department of Homeland Security finished its first bioterrorism risk assessment in 
January 2006.  That and the upcoming 2008 assessment employs a probabilistic risk assessment 
methodology designed to guide prioritization of ongoing biodefense-related research, 
development, planning and preparedness.  The methodology and the scientific work it 
subsequently identifies as necessary have generated some discussion about both its design and 
consequence.  This paper clarifies the current debate, describes the current processes in place, 
and identifies issues that merit further discussion. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Biodefense encompasses an enormous range of activities that necessarily require policymakers to 
make trade-offs when allocating time, effort, and funding.  Threat characterization is one 
controversial piece of the effort due to insufficient public information about how requirements 
are generated and how it is performed, and also in part because of widely divergent estimates as 
to the potentially harmful consequences of such scientific investigations as currently practiced.  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created the National Biodefense Analysis and 
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) to perform threat characterization research as part of its 
mission to understand the biological threat to the US.  A review of the issues that have 
accompanied the creation of NBACC and a description of the threat characterization process as it 
is currently practiced is presented here.  In this way, a more informed discussion can proceed. 
 
DHS presented the NBACC concept in 2003.  In 2004, a Biodefense Knowledge Center was 
created within DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  At Fort Detrick, a new 
NBACC facility is under construction that will house the National Bioforensic Analysis Center 
and the Biological Threat Characterization Center when it is completed in 2008.  This will be a 
part of the National Interagency Biodefense Campus.  The mission of NBACC is to understand 
current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; 




1 Testimony of Penrose Albright, Assistant Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Department of Homeland 
Security, before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, (February 8, 2005) as cited in 
Dana A. Shea, “The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress,” CRS 
Report for Congress (15 February 2007).  See also, “Battelle Wins Contract to Operate National Biodefense 




In 2004, a detailed slide presentation described the kinds of threat assessment work that was 
intended for the proposed NBACC facility.2  These included the acquisition, growth, 
modification, storage, stabilization, packaging and dispersal of classical, emerging, and 
genetically engineered pathogens.  All work was originally intended to be classified.   Soon after, 
the White House presented its biodefense strategy in which four major areas were outlined: 
Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection, and Response and 
Recovery.3  One critical element of the US biodefense policy is the periodic assessment of the 
biological weapons threat.  To do this, the directive required a “continuous, formal process for 
conducting routine capabilities assessments to guide prioritization of our on-going investments in 
biodefense-related research, development, planning, and preparedness.”   
 
DHS submitted its first bioterrorism risk assessment to the White House on January 31, 2006.  It 
was a classified document.  Battelle, who in December 2006 won the contract to operate the 
NBACC facility at Fort Detrick, completed the first bioterrorism assessment in nine months.  It 
was a first attempt to apply a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology for estimating 
bioterrorism risk.4 As such, it incorporated only the infectious dose and mortality rate for agent 
parameters and limited data quality matrices.5  The 2008 assessment will employ more extensive 
data quality matrices and include new agent-specific parameters and incorporate new scenarios 
such as the impact of the worried-well. In addition, while the 2006 assessment incorporated a 
single “test” enhanced agent (a multi-drug resistant bacterium), in the future additional enhanced 
agents are planned, including advanced agents, such as those that may be synthesized de novo in 
a laboratory.6 
 
The risk assessment helps to determine biodefense-related research.  Concerns about the kinds of 
work that is being pursued at NBACC under conditions that are largely kept secret started a 
debate about whether the US should be involved in such secret work at all and particularly in the 
aggressive way articulated.7  Many experts in the biodefense field have raised concerns about 
BWC compliance by the US in general and the possibility for emulation of the current US 
biodefense work by other countries.8   
                                                            
2 George Korch, “Leading Edge of Biodefense – the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center”, 
Proceedings, Military Entomology – Its Global Challenge, 2004 DoD Pest Management Workshop, Naval Air 
Station, Jacksonville, Florida, February 9-13, 2004. 
3 The White House, Biodefense for the 21st Century (Washington, DC: April 28, 2004). 
4 See NJ McMillan et al., “An end-to-end quantitative approach for estimating bioterrorism risk,” Abstract submitted 
to the Society for Risk Analysis Annual Meeting 2007.  Downloaded from 
http://birenheide.com/sra/2007AM/program/singlesession.php3?sessid=M4-I. 
5 Department of Homeland Security, “2008 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: Thoughts and Impressions from the 
NAS Interim Report,” presentation to the Committee on Methodological Improvement to the Department of 
Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (10 February 2007). 
6 Department of Homeland Security, “2008 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: Thoughts and Impressions from the 
NAS Interim Report,” presentation to the Committee on Methodological Improvement to the Department of 
Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (10 February 2007). 
7 Milton Leitenberg, James Leonard, Richard Spertzel, “Biodefense crossing the line,” Politics and the Life Sciences 
22, no. 2 (17 May 2004): 2-3. 
8 See John Steinbruner, “In the Name of Defense,” The New Scientist (25 November 2006): www.newscientist.com; 
Christian Enemark, “United States biodefense, international law, and the problem of intent,” Politics and the Life 
Sciences 24, no. 1-2 (19 July 2006): 32-42; Peter Aldhous and Michael Reilly, “Bioterror Special: Friend or 
Foe?” The New Scientist no. 2573 (14 October 2006);  Lois R. Ember, “Testing the Limits,” Chemical and 




The key issue being debated is what kind of biodefense work the US should be pursuing and the 
conditions under which that work should be performed.  Some have argued that greater 
transparency is necessary for both in order to provide reassurance and greater scientific rigor.9  
However, while it is acknowledged that reassurance about the defensive intent and 
methodological credibility of US biodefense research is important and beneficial, there are also 
significant risks from making some investigations and research results known.10  What the 
current debate can benefit from is historical perspective: these issues have circulated since the 
start of the US bioweapons program in World War II.  While still unresolved, past experience 
can shed some light on our biodefense choices and consequences. 
 
Threat assessment today incorporates estimates of enemy capability and intention, estimates of 
effects of biological agents, estimates of response capabilities, and potential effects of modified 
agents based on scientific or technological feasibility.  This approach – and the assumptions that 
are inherent in it – has a relevant historical record. 
 
 
Threat Assessment and Past US BW Work 
 
From its beginning in World War II, US biodefense efforts included threat assessments to inform 
and guide its research efforts (1942 – 1969).  After President Nixon terminated the US offensive 
program, USAMRIID continued the medical biodefense effort without a concomitant scientific 
threat assessment effort (1969 – 1990s).  This generated some critiques that the US biodefense 
effort was neither properly focused nor prepared to meet novel threats made possible by 
enormous advances in biotechnology.  The presumption throughout is that biological threat 
assessments can help indicate what biodefense research and preparedness is necessary.  What 
kinds of information are necessary for threat assessment has shifted over time as have strategies 
to address the perceived threat.  Throughout the history of the US biodefense effort there has 
been tension between scientific arguments for greater transparency and security requirements for 
greater secrecy. 
 
The need for the US to perform its first biological threat assessment arose during World War II 
when the original presumption11 that biological weapons were potentially powerful, but too 
unmanageable for standard military operations was revisited.  In 1940, the consensus of the US 
National Institute of Health (NIH) and the US Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) was that 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
The Journal of clinical Investigation 114, no. 1 (1 July 2004): 2-3;; Jonathan Tucker, “Biological Threat 
Assessment: Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?” Arms Control today 34, no. 8 (October 2004): 13-19; and 
Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando, “Back to Bioweapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 
2003): 41-45. 
9 John Steinbruner and Stacy Okutani, “The Protective Oversight of Biotechnology,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 2, no. 4 (December 2004): 273 – 280. 
10 James B. Petro and W. Seth Carus, “Biological Threat Characterization Research: A Critical Component of 
National Biodefense,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 3, no. 4 (2005): 
295-308. 
11 L.A. fox, “Bacterial warfare: the use of biologic agents in warfare,” The Military Surgeon 72: 189-207, 1933 
(reprinted in The Military Surgeon 90, no. 5 (May 1942)). 
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biological weapons were most useful as sabotage weapons.12  However, the US Army Surgeon 
General pressed for the development of countermeasures to possible enemy BW weapons.  This 
stated need for better defenses prompted the US to establish a BW committee within the US 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to look at the whole issue of biological warfare, “to survey 
the present situation and the future possibilities.”13   
 
The BW committee that was formed existed for less than a year but in that short time overcame 
the major obstacle to military investment in BW: “Biological Warfare is regarded as distinctly 
feasible…The majority of the authors conclude that biological warfare is entirely possible, even 
probable, and that in the future, its use will be governed by the likelihood of military 
effectiveness rather than by any moral considerations or international agreements.”14   
 
In addition, the BW committee articulated an important presumption: “it is obvious that 
preparation for defense necessitates a knowledge of the offense and, if this knowledge is not 
available from experience, it must come from the results of careful investigation.”15  This 
perspective was shared by the UK: “My instructions are that H.M. Government feels that (1) a 
study of offense is an essential preliminary to the study of defense, (2) offensive studies are 
valueless until they are taken to a stage of complete realism.”16   
 
That is, the concept of fully investigating the offense as necessary a priori to effective 
development of defenses became established for biological weapon threat assessment.  Once it 
was accepted that biological warfare was probable – regardless of the basis for this decision – 
attention focused on characterizing likely effects.  Threat assessment therefore did not need to 
incorporate estimates of likelihood of use, but could instead focus on estimates of biological and 
strategic effects.  This is an important leap in logic.   It likely reflected the paucity of useful 
information from the intelligence community about the nature of the actual BW threat attributed 
to Japan and Germany during World War II.   However, as the basis for planning, it was flawed 
and led to activities that were unnecessary in hindsight. 
 
The US BW committee performed a wide-ranging, largely theoretical assessment of every 
candidate agent as to its possible methods of producing a harmful effect on man, animals, plants, 
                                                            
12 The progress report prepared by CWS (August 28, 1939) is cited in “Progress Report No. 54: 
Biological and Bacteriological Warfare” (August 15, 1941), National Academies of Science Archive: 
Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 1: “Organization and Administrative Liaison: 1941- 
1942.” The NIH opinion is reported in a Letter from R.E. Dyer, Chief, Division of Infectious 
Diseases, NIH to The Surgeon General, USPHS, Bethesda, Maryland, December 16, 1940. National 
Academies of Science Archive: Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 1: “National Institute 
of Health: 1941.” 
13 “Conference on Biological Warfare” (August 20, 1941), National Academy of Sciences Archive, 
Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 1, “Beginning of Program.” 
14 E.B. Fred, Chairman, “Report of the W.B.C. Committee” (February 19, 1942). National Academy of 
Sciences Archive, Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 2, “Report: February 1942.” 
15 E.B. Fred, Chairman, “Report of the W.B.C. Committee” (February 19, 1942). National Academy of 
Sciences Archive, Committees on Biological Warfare Series 1, Box 2, “Report: February 1942.” 
16 Paul Fildes, “Organization of B.W. in the United Kingdom,” (November 10, 1942), National 




and food supplies.17  The appendices to the 1942 report are exhaustive discussions of the range 
of microbes that could be made into a threat and possible methods for their use.  It is possible to 
characterize US threat assessment work at that time as depending largely on estimates of two 
factors:  the first is likely effect (as discussed in the 1942 report) and the second is technological 
feasibility.   
 
Technological (or scientific) feasibility is the second major criteria in threat assessments at the 
time because the US and UK lacked solid evidence about their adversary’s BW programs.  The 
US and UK assumed that any technological or scientific progress they were exploiting was, 
logically, likely already to have been applied by their adversaries.  One intelligence estimate at 
the time concluded, “it is safe to assume that the Germans have made much further advances in 
the field of experimentation with anthrax and that they developed more advanced bombs and 
other methods for its dissemination.”18  This kind of concern about technological inferiority 
emerges regularly in historical documents of the time.   
 
Based on information from the initial threat assessment, investment began in a limited civilian 
R&D program that moved quickly into total military control with a drive toward bioweapons 
production.  By war’s end the BW program alone had consumed over $44 million 
(approximately $500 million in 2006 dollars).  It soon became apparent that the US and UK BW 
programs – like its nuclear program – was larger and far more sophisticated in comparison to 
Japanese or German investment in the same areas.   
 
The only successful vaccine developed and produced during the war was the product of a joint 
US-Canadian effort.  In 1941, rinderpest was of immediate concern.  The first BW project 
approved and begun was for the production and storage of rinderpest vaccine – a wholly 
defensive project that lacked any modeling or elaborate modeling of potential effect as an 
offensive weapon. Within two years, a plant was established that maintained a stockpile of at 
least 5,000 doses of vaccine.  In addition, researchers developed a new vaccine that could be 
manufactured more rapidly, induce immunity more swiftly, and could be dried without loss of 
potency for a long period of time.  Only after these major issues of defense were overcome was 
there any consideration for a request to investigate the offensive potential of the rinderpest 
virus.19  Rinderpest, however, was the exception: the offensive potential of other potential BW 
agents were studied either before or along with a defensive investigation.  No bioweapons were 
produced by the US during World War II. 
 
A brief reconsideration 
The 1942 threat assessment had erred in two ways: it assumed the existence of enemy BW 
programs that it turned out Germany did not have.  It also assumed investigation of similar 
agents and processes, but the Japanese were dropping plague-infested fleas (among other 
                                                            
17 The first BW committee was named the WBC Committee and later renamed first the ABC Committee and then 
the DEF Committee. 
18 “Probable Biological Agents which may be Employed by the Enemy,” (1 January 1944) in Historical Report of 
the War Research Service, November 1944 – Final.  National Academy of Sciences Archive, Series 4, Box 5, 
Section II, 149. 
19 Historical Report of the War Research Service, November 1944-Final. National Academy of 
Sciences Archive, Committees on Biological Warfare Series 4, Box 5. 
6 
 
grotesque activities) and not developing anthrax bombs.20  Furthermore, biological weapons 
were found to not be so readily feasible in fact.  There were significant hurdles that had to be 
overcome. 
 
Nonetheless, continuation and expansion of the program was urged by the CWS over the 
reluctance of many members of the same civilian scientific advisory group that had initially 
convinced a skeptical military to invest in a BW program. The scientific advisors did not have a 
sense from the military as to what they wanted from a biological weapon – how were they to 
design a biological weapon without knowing the applications for which they were intended?  For 
their part, the military planners themselves did not know what they wanted because they wanted 
the scientists to first describe the potential uses for BW.21  There was clearly a difference of 
opinion as to which was the cart and which the horse. 
 
Furthermore, many scientists on the NAS committee believed that the US BW program should 
either be terminated or made a wholly medical defense issue.22  Therefore, to determine a course 
of action going forward – and in the context of rapidly changing world events, a new committee 
in 1949 was asked to “undertake a full examination of all the technical and strategic possibilities 
of biological warfare.”23   
 
In its examination, the 1949 BW committee took a similar approach as the 1942 BW committee: 
first, it presumed US inferiority in BW development, “The United States, although it enjoys 
atomic superiority… does not necessarily possess a corresponding superiority in the field of 
biological warfare – in fact, the situation might be the reverse.”24  Second, it based its 
recommendations on theoretical estimates of the potential effectiveness of bioweapons (i.e. 
scientific possibility) and not known enemy capabilities.  Their recommendation was largely for 
better medical and civilian defenses to protect the obviously vulnerable US cities. 
 
A year later, the military decided to pursue a bioweapons capability.  Rather than implementing 
recommendations for better defense, it adopted a strategy emphasizing punishment.  Brigadier 
General William Creasy, head of R&D (CWS) and later the Chief, CWS, wrote in 1952, 
“although development of adequate protective measures against CBR attack is an important part 
                                                            
20 Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-up (New 
York: Routledge, 2002). 
21 William B. Sarles, “Report on DEF Committee Meetings.  June 17-18, 1946, National Academies of Science 
Archives, Committees on  Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Joint Security Control: 1944 – 1948.” 
22 See the following:  W. Mansfield Clark, Letter to Perry Pepper (25 June 1946), National Academies of Science 
Archives, Committees on  Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 6: “Meeting: Report & Follow-up: Jun 1946”; and 
Ernest W. Goodpasture, M.D., Letter to Perry Pepper (October 16, 1946), National Academies of Science 
Archives, Committees on  Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 5: “Advisory committee on BW 1946 – 1948”;  and 
W.A. Hagan, Letter to Perry Pepper (4 July, 1946), National Academies of Science Archives, Committees on  
Biological Warfare, Series 5, Box 6: “Meeting: Report & Follow-up: Jun 1946”; and  J. Howard Mueller, Letter 
to Perry Pepper (24 June 1946), National Academies of Science Archives, Committees on  Biological Warfare, 
Series 5, Box 6: “Meeting: Report & Follow-up: Jun 1946.” 
23 Letter from Secretary of Defense Forrestal to Dr. Caryl Haskins (16 March 1949), in Report of the Secretary of 
Defense’s AD HOC COMMITTEE on Biological Warfare (11 July 1949), Papers of Harry S. Truman President’s 
Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Library. 
24 Report of the Secretary of Defense’s AD HOC COMMITTEE on Biological Warfare (11 July 1949), Papers of 
Harry S. Truman President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Library, 6. 
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of Chemical Corps work, the development of superior offensive potential is believed to be an 
even greater deterrent to potential aggressors.”25   The extended strategic implications of having 
bioweapons was not studied systematically until 1969, when detailed consideration by the Office 
of Strategic Assessment revealed the flaws of a deterrent strategy for BW – and even more the 
implausibility of effective military use.26  It was a situation not unlike that for the Davy Crockett 
nuclear missile: the US developed a small nuclear weapon that worked, but one that could not be 
employed in any imaginable military scenario. 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, literally hundreds of tests were performed using live biological agents 
and biological simulants.27   New production and testing facilities were created: five anticrop and 
eight antipersonnel agents were standardized. 28  The Directorate of Biological Operations was 
created at Pine Bluff Arsenal for production and storage of biological agents.  
 
Between 1954 and 1967, the facility produced the following biological agents and toxins: 
Brucella suis, Francisella tularensis, Q fever rickettsia, VEE, Bacillus anthracis, 
botulinum toxin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin.  Bulk agents and antipersonnel 
munitions filled with these various agents and toxins were produced and stored at DBA 
as a deterrent capability.29 
 
The US BW program was conducted in secret and much of its work remains classified – as is 
probably appropriate to the kinds of knowledge it generated about offensive BW potential. 
 
By 1969, the US had an arsenal of biological weapons that included over one thousand pounds of 
dry, lethal anti-personnel agent (in addition to over 150,000 pounds of wet, anti-crop agent)30 but 
few usable medical defenses  – and a total lack of emergency preparedness for the civilian 
population despite hundreds of tests that demonstrated the vulnerability of cities to sabotage or 





25 William M. Creasy, “Research and Engineering Command,” Armed Forces Chemical Journal v, no.4 (April 
1952): 44, 46. 
26 Han Swyter, “Political Considerations and Analysis of Military Requirements for Chemical and Biological 
Weapons,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 65, no. 1 (15 
January 1970): 261-270. 
27 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, Volume II (24 February 
1977), Appendix E and Appendix F.   See also, National Academy of Sciences, Toxicologic Assessment of the 
Army’s Zinc Cadmium Sulfide Dispersion Tests (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997). 
28 Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, “Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare and Biological 
Research Programs as of 1 November 1970,” downloaded from www.gwo.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58. 
29 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs, Volume II (24 February 
1977), D-2. 
30  See Memo for the President from Dr. Edward E. David (6 July 1970); White House Title Folder Vol. 
1 (1969); Box 1; WHCF; SMOF David; Nixon presidential Matierials, National Archives; also, Interdepartmental 
Political-Military Group, “Annual Review of United States Chemical Warfare 
and Biological Research Programs as of 1 November 1970,” Doc 24b downloaded from 
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58. 
31 See Appendix E, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs (24 February 1977). 
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A Second Reconsideration  
After 1969, when President Nixon unilaterally terminated the offensive BW program, there were 
two major changes to the way biodefense work was conducted: it operated without an offensive 
program (biological agent stockpiles and weapons were destroyed) and it operated at an 
unclassified status.  The reasoning and historical sequence of events has already been recounted 
in some detail.32  Essentially, bioweapons were determined to be ineffective military weapons for 
the US, and created a great deal of risk.  Better, then, that the US renounce such weapons, 
provide reassurance, and encourage others to emulate.  This led to US support for the Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention that was signed in 1972.  Much information about past 
programs became publicly available: in the same year that the authoritative six-volume study 
was published, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare,33 the USSR launched its 
program to modernize and expand its bioweapons program and founded Biopreparat.34 
 
While the USSR was busy applying the revolution in genetic engineering to bioweapons, the US 
worked on improving medical defenses, albeit at a much lower level of investment than the 
USSR. It is not at all clear based on publicly available documents which effort was more 
successful – whether heavy Soviet investments in novel bioweapons outran very modest US 
investments in novel therapies, discussed below. 
 
Post-1969 Biodefense 
Without an offensive program, the US biodefense effort was limited to information from the 
intelligence community and testing of experimental vaccines against known and emerging 
diseases of potential BW threat.  Large, open-air tests in public areas ceased and modeling of 
potential consequence was not done.  Instead, the US program limited itself largely to 
development of medical defenses and protective equipment for the US military against agents 
based on criteria that have not been published, but largely reflected concerns with classic BW 
agents and emerging infectious diseases like the filoviruses and hemorrhagic fever viruses.  
Because work was done in an unclassified setting, certain opportunities for international 
collaboration were pursued with beneficial effect. 
 
Threat assessment types of work were limited at Ft. Detrick to determining whether an agent 
posed an aerosol threat – as a wet agent. It was not considered necessary to run tests with dry 
agents. Much of the work was, by its nature, dual use.  These included aerosol stability tests, the 
identification of resistant strains, large-scale production of agents and toxins (and purification 
methods), and animal challenge tests to determine LD50s. However, no work was done to 
deliberately enhance virulence: 
 
Use of recombinant DNA procedures with pathogenic organisms and toxins 
is closely controlled at all locations, both within and outside the government. 
Development of a more virulent strain of a pathogen is specifically prohibited 
                                                            
32 Forrest Russel Frank, U.S. Arms Control Policymaking: the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention Case, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Stanford University (November 1974), 124. 
33 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Stockholm: 
Almqvist & Wiksell, 1973). 
34 Discussion of new Soviet investment in 1973 is discussed in Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard 
(New York: Random House, 1999), 41. 
9 
 
under any circumstance, and is not the goal of any BDRP effort. In fact, 
BDRP uses of recombinant techniques are with the goal of producing a less 
virulent strain which may be more safely used in the laboratory or for vaccine 
development.”35 
 
Work performed was predominantly protective: threat assessment was done in the context of a 
medical therapy being developed and not simply to evaluate vulnerabilities. When aerosol 
stability tests were done without a candidate vaccine to test, these were in response to 
information from the intelligence community (e.g. T-2 mycotoxins after allegations of use). 
 
USAMRIID spent the vast majority of its limited manpower and funding – approximately $23 
million per year (in 2006 dollars) – on the development of vaccines and therapies to major 
biothreat agents.36 As of 1969, only the anthrax and tularemia vaccines were considered to be 
both safe and effective against various forms of their respective diseases.   (The licensed plague 
vaccine was safe but not effective against aerosolized Yersinia pestis).  For all the other agents 
that had been weaponized, the vaccines in existence were known to induce unacceptably high 
levels of undesirable reactions, or unacceptable side-effects, or both. 
 
The 1989 Biological Defense Research Program report stated, “While the detailed threat 
analyses provided by the intelligence community are classified, ALL WORK CONDUCTED 
UNDER THE BDRP IS UNCLASSIFIED. Those results which impinge on the national security 
may be classified in accordance with Army Regulation 380-86.”37   While not all work was 
published in the open scientific literature, publications out of USAMRIID rose from a few dozen 
in 1969 and 1970 to regularly around 100 in the 1980s.38  Foreign scientists worked at 
USAMRIID and collaborative efforts resulted in new vaccines and field trials in other countries 
that enhanced confidence in the medical countermeasures developed at USAMRIID. 
 
Today, the rationale for biological threat assessments is based on a need to prepare for the 
possibility of a terrorist attack.  What is added to the new assessments is an estimation of the 
probability of a terrorist being able to acquire or produce a virulent pathogen.  Modeling is 
important not so much for creating medical defenses, but to realistically characterize and thereby 
anticipate potential attack scenarios in order to organize a more effective response and identify 






35 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense 
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD: 
USAMRDC, 1989): 5-9.  Emphasis is in the text. 
36 All information is derived from a review of the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 
Annual Progress Report, for the years FY1969- FY1990. 
37 U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC), Biological Defense 
Research Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Frederick, MD: 
USAMRDC, 1989), 2-2.  (The emphasis is in the text.) 
38 Stacy M. Okutani, Structuring Biodefense: Legacies and Current Policy Choices, Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Maryland (2007), 115. 
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Threat Assessments Present 
 
The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states that “the knowledge, technology, and 
materials needed to build weapons of mass destruction are spreading.  These capabilities have 
never been more accessible and the trends are not in our favor.”39  US concern over bioterrorism 
intensified during the 1990s:40 this concern was fed in part by actual attempts by groups like the 
Aum Shinrikyo to disperse biological agents and then validated by the 2001 anthrax letters.41    
Some classified threat assessment research was done after intelligence indicated possible 
activities by other state bioweapons programs.42  When such US activities were revealed, it 
created concern about US compliance with its obligations under the BWC.  
 
More recently, the US has invested heavily in biodefense.  The vast majority of funding has gone 
to medical countermeasures through research administered through the Department of Health 
and Human Services.  The NIAID biodefense research program at HHS began in 2002 – prior to 
a full and complete threat assessment.  Its Strategic Plan continues to guide the implementation 
of a research and development program necessary to a biodefense effort.43  For example, the 
criteria for agents included on Category A list was quickly determined to be: ease of 
dissemination (or transmission person-to-person); high mortality, with potential for major public 
health impact; possibility for causing public panic and social disruption; and may require special 
action for public health preparedness.  Criteria for agents on the Category B & C lists reflect 
generally less potential for a severe impact on public health preparedness and disruption. 
 
In addition to the NIAID tiered agent categories, the CDC and USDA have a list of Select 
Agents – both human, animal, and overlap pathogens that require compliance with certain rules 
for researchers who work with them.  These lists are largely similar.  The Department of 
Homeland Security added a third list of agents for its purposes.  The DHS list is unlike the other 
lists in that it ranks the agents in some order of severity and incorporates intelligence 
information, making it not a pure consequence model.  Nonetheless, there are a few agents at the 
top of the list (approximately six) that are reported to be significantly more worrisome than the 
remainder.  The remainder of this article describes the process that generated the listing of 
ranked agents and the oversight processes that have developed.  Inherent in this description is an 
attempt to understand what this method and its results have done to enhance understanding and 






39 The Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002), 9. 
40 Susan Wright, “Terrorists and biological weapons: Forging the linkage in the Clinton Administration,” Politics 
and the Life Sciences 25, no. 1-2 (March – September 2006): 57-115. 
41 Milton Leitenberg, “Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat,” Strategic Studies Institute 
monograph (December 2005). 
42 Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). 
43 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, NIAID Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research (February 2002), 
NIH Publication No. 03-5306.  Downloaded from http://biodefense.niaid.nih.gov 
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NBACC and Bioterrorism Risk Assessment44 
NBACC exists within the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  It performs both laboratory research and mathematical modeling for the assessment of 
the bioterrorism risk to the U.S.  As a first step, an assessment was made of 28 human pathogens 
considered a likely threat to the US.  These were ranked according to the threat they posed, 
according to both intelligence information and potential consequence.  The first bioterrorism risk 
assessment, Bioterrorism Risk Assessment 2006,45 was completed and delivered to the White 
House on January 31, 2006.   It is a classified document and was therefore not reviewed for this 
paper.  Another assessment will be completed in 2008 that will incorporate the economic effect 
of agricultural pathogens. 
 
Agents were ranked according to two main criteria.  The first was according to the classic 
characteristics of the agent (unenhanced, except for one agent where there was evidence that an 
antibiotic-resistant strain had already been created). The second criteria dealt with whether the 
agent was likely to be produced and disseminated by terrorists. 
 
Batelle performed the assessment for NBACC based on the known characteristics of the agent.  
For the public health consequence modeling, numerous variables were incorporated, including 
agent selection, target selection, and production and dissemination methods.  Based on the 
models, estimates of the range of an agent’s risk was presented as broad confidence intervals for 
comparison. DHS adopted the PRA methodology “both as a mechanism for providing regular 
‘snapshots’ of bioterrorism risk to the nation, and as a risk mitigation strategy evaluation tool for 
use by risk managers.” 46 
 
Sensitivity studies were then performed to discriminate between consequences.  There were three 
broad categories: high relative risk, moderate relative risk, and low consequence.  Once the 
ranking of the 28 agents was completed, NBACC discussed the rationale for it with the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  Because the risk assessment was assembled 
from numerous discrete criteria, it was possible to begin estimating what variables were 
“pushing” the ranking for each agent.  This allowed for in-depth discussions with experts to 
debate the merits of the rank of each agent and, it is believed, enhanced the credibility of the 
overall assessment. 
 
That is, the process of ranking the 28 major human pathogens was refined through repeated 
interactions with experts who themselves had to reassess what they understood about the agents.  
Those who conducted the assessment attempted in every instance to support every assertion with 
scientific documentation so that the assessment was grounded in experimentation.  Sometimes 
what was accepted as true lacked a published scientific basis.    
 
                                                            
44 Okutani interview with NBACC official, April 2007. 
45 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment. 2006.  Biological Threat Characterization Center of the National Biodefense 
Analysis and Countermeasure Center.  Washington, DC.  Cited in The National Research Council, Interim 
Report on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Risk Analysis 
(Washington, DC:  National Academies Press, 2007). 
46 McMillan, NJ et al., “An end-to-end quantitative approach for estimating bioterrorism risk,” Abstract for a panel 
proposed for the SRA 2007 Annual Meeting, “Risk 007: Agents of Analysis.”  Downloaded from www.sra.org. 
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However, because of the second criteria – likely terrorist use – the NBACC assessment is not a 
pure consequence model like the one the NIH used in creating it list of agents (A,B,C).  For this 
information, the NBACC assessment drew from information from the intelligence community 
that necessarily required the final assessment to be classified.  Scenarios were estimated based on 
potential terrorist capability: from proliferation from a state-sponsored program through a 
highly-funded organization, to terrorists working in cells or as lone actors.   
 
However, because there were some significant uncertainties regarding some intelligence 
information and estimates of terrorist activities, the model was run twice: once with the 
intelligence and expert information and once without (i.e. assuming that the terrorist groups had 
access to all the agents).  This was done to ensure that the value of the information the US had 
was not discounted and also that it would not unduly influence the outcomes.47  
 
The final model can be updated with new information or to test a variety of assumptions.  It is 
possible to “dial in” or “dial out” parameters such as acquisition methods, effects, types of 
attacks, etc.  A range of situations can be modeled in order to estimate effect.  In this way, the 
relative risk of a variety of terrorist actions can be estimated.  In so doing, important knowledge 
gaps were identified.  Part of NBACC’s mission is to reduce these knowledge gaps in order to 
improve the accuracy of the estimates in its risk modeling.  This is where the crux of concern 
about NBACC’s work is centered.  
 
NBACC annually has somewhere between 35-50 research projects underway annually.  The vast 
majority of the budget has been spent on traditional agents.  However, a small amount of time 
has been spent looking at enhanced and emerging agents in order to assess the potential 
usefulness of such to a bioterrorist.  At this point, NBACC is developing a strategy for dealing 
with advanced agents.    
 
Some projects are “born classified” if they draw upon information from an intelligence source.  
Other projects can be classified if it reveals a significant vulnerability to the nation or a system.   
 
Classification does not imply compartmentalization, however.  If research reveals a vulnerability 
and a remedy is identified, that information is not concealed.  Rather, such information is quickly 
provided to the US department who can implement any adjustments to address the threat in a 
discrete way.  That is, the defense can improved without widespread knowledge of the 
vulnerability identified.  In one case, for example, a threat to the US water supply was identified 
that could be readily addressed with a change to certain standards (e.g. temperature settings).  
That that information was given to the Department of Agriculture and a simple revision to 




Internal Scientific Review48 
The scientific review process occurs through three basic levels of effort.  The first is the project 
identification.  This begins with the work of the Biothreat Risk Assessment that is performed 
                                                            
47 Okutani interview with government consultant (October 2007). 
48 Okutani interview with DHS official. (May 2007) 
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every two years by the BTCC (described above).  The BTRA model estimates the threat from 
identified biothreat agents using seventeen different nodes to populate a computational analysis.  
There are many subject matter experts involved in this process.  Knowledge about agents and 
their growth and stability properties are gathered.  Finally, a literature review (open-source) is 
done to know what is understood about the agents.  If there are gaps in knowledge, these are then 
made into a scientific question that can be answered.  By the time a project is identified, there is 
a scientific vetting system in place. 
 
The second step is to identify the objectives.  These are questions that will address and improve 
the risk assessment.  This has a major impact on the threat assessment.  The threat assessment, 
after all, drives the funding for countermeasures. 
 
The last step is the search for proposals.  Specific researchers with expertise in the subject area 
are sought who can work with Category A select agents; who have a track record in working 
with such agents, and who, preferably, are affiliated with a government institution (e.g. 
FDA/USDA/HHS) it is easier to move funding to another government institution rather than a 
private entity.  That does not exclude private institutions, as NBACC has worked with some 
private institutions with a history or technologies able to work with threat agents.   
 
A Broad Agency Announcement is made and proposals are then reviewed as they are received.  
Researchers who participate in the working groups that review proposals are not allowed to 
review their own project or those in competition with theirs.   
 
NBACC conducts an internal scientific review to evaluate proposals for weakness, methodology, 
fit with the mission space, appropriateness to the mission stated, and whether it fills a knowledge 
gap or otherwise bridges known information.  If a project passes this stage of review and is 
accepted, a second, external review is performed by the American Institute of Biosciences.  They 
perform an independent evaluation with scientific and technical experts.  AIB comments on the 
scientific merit of the work and the workplan. 
 
DHS also takes steps to ensure that projects are performed under appropriately certified facilities 
and conditions.  DHS performs site inspections of facilities that they work with.  Within DHS, 
the Science and Technology Group re-checks the facilities’ documentation to ensure compliance 
with all applicable regulations (animal use, human use, recombinant work, etc).   
 
The vast majority of work is not classified unless classification is determined to be appropriate.  
A small number of projects come classified because the information comes from the intelligence 
community.  Finally, results of a research project can be classified if they reveal a vulnerability. 
 
 
External Scientific Review 
There are three recent processes that have been created to provide external – meaning, non-
departmental – scientific review of the NBACC work.. The first is the National Academy of 
Sciences board that was stood up in 2006 to review the BTRA methodology.  The second is the 
Scientific and Technical Advisory Council (STAC) created in 2007 by Batelle that reviews all 
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NBACC work.  The third is a new interagency review group created by Presidential Directive 
and is a “For Office Use Only” document (Appendix 1 to HSPD-10).   
 
DHS presented its 2006 methodology to the National Academy of Sciences.  In 2006 an interim 
NAS report was given to DHS49, to which comments were received50.  A final draft of the NAS 
recommendations is being circulated and may eventually become available for public review if it 
passes the DHS security review.  As already discussed, the NAS review is limited to an 
examination of the methodology used and not its findings. 
 
The STAC was created in 2007 in order to provide some independent scientific review of the 
work at NBACC, in particular the Biothreat Characterization Center.  It reflects, in part, a desire 
to reassure scientists working on NBACC projects and in part to assure others that such are 
scientifically rigorous.  The STAC members were not publicly announced and any release of 
their names requires the consent of their affiliated institutions.  The STAC members review 
projects and can indicate whether they have concerns or if a project raises a perception of 
concern, but do not have authority to recommend changes.51 
 
Finally, there is a new interagency review group that was created by Presidential Directive in the 
middle of 2007.  Little is known about the group – either its membership or processes – because 
the document was not publicly circulated. Its purpose is to provide a more independent review 




On August 26, 2005, Secretary Chertoff issued Management Directive System Number 6300, 
“Compliance with, and inplementation of, arms control agreements.”  The Directive “provides 
policy and responsibilities for Department of Homeland Security implementation of arms control 
agreements of the United States Government and compliance with them.”  It applies to all 
organizational entities within DHS and those US National Laboratories, universities, and private 
contractors directly engaged in work to support DHS at the federal level.  The term “arms control 
agreements” applies to “all legally and politically binding arms control measures to which the 
United States is a Party or a signatory.”  This includes confidence building measures. 
 
According to the directive, “All relevant research, development, and acquisition projects shall be 
assessed for arms control compliance at inception, prior to funding approval, whenever there is 
significant project change, and whenever in the course of project execution an issue potentially 
raises a compliance concern.”  Such compliance will be carries out in such as way so as to avoid 
compromise of national security information. 
 
                                                            
49 The National Research Council, Interim Report on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Biological Risk Analysis (Washington, DC:  National Academies Press, 2007). 
50 Department of Homeland Security, “2008 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: Thoughts and Impressions from 
the NAS Interim Report,” presentation to the Committee on Methodological Improvement to the Department of 
Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (10 February 2007). 
51 Okutani interview with government consultant (October 2007). 
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For this purpose, a Compliance Review Group (CRG) was established within DHS to review all 
BW and CW countermeasures activities.  The CRG is chaired by the Deputy Secretary, DHS and 
the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, John Vitko, is the Executive Secretary.  The 
other members of the CRG are the General Counsel and the Under Secretary for Policy (and any 
others as appropriate).   
 
As of July 2007, the CRG has met four times since its inception and has reviewed hundreds of 
DHS projects.52  The Deputy Secretary reviews and approves compliance determinations of the 
CRG on behalf of the Secretary, DHS.  However, if there is no agreement within the CRG, the 
Chair “shall recommend to the Secretary a treaty compliance determination, including any 
dissenting views of CRG members, or of other Department subcomponents and agencies that 
have equities in the matter.  The Secretary will provide guidance or compliance determination on 
such issues.”53 
 
The Executive Secretary to the DHS CRG shall “ensure that any issue that reasonably raises a 
compliance concern is brought to the CRG for a compliance determination.”54  The Management 
Directive explicitly directs the heads of DHS subcomponents and agencies to “coordinate with 
the Executive Secretary of the CRG before taking any action, including but not limited to 
research, tests, development, exercises, and operations, that could reasonably raise an issue of 
DHS compliance with an arms control agreement.”  If any activity raises any doubt about 
compliance, counsel should be sought.   
 
To carry out project reviews, a Compliance Assurance Program (CAP) office was created within 
the Under Secretary for Science and Technology.  The CAP office requires that every project 
leader submit a Project Summary and complete a BWC Checklist.  The Project Summary 
requires the following: the Title, Rationale, Objective, and Status of the project and a brief 
description of the scientific and technical approach, the names of any toxic chemicals, biological 
select agents and toxins, or novel reagents used in the project, and the types, quantities, and 
disposition of any dissemination means used as well as a rationale for their use. 
 
The BWC Checklist is a list of twenty-two questions that fall into five categories.  The first 
seven questions are taken from the NSABB Criteria for Identifying Dual Use Research of 
Concern.  There are two questions regarding the agents used – whether select agents or the 
generation or use of recombinant or synthetic DNA are involved.  Two others regarding intent 
are derived from Article I of the BWC.  There are four questions about the facilities and 
equipment used and seven about the project’s purpose.   
 
There is both a legal review of the information submitted and a review to identify aspects of a 
project that might foster perceptions of concern.  Those who participate in the CAP reviews are 
intelligence analysts, economists and microbiologists.  These assessors are totally independent of 
those doing the work being reviewed and those who perform the scientific reviews.    
 
                                                            
52 Okutani nterview with consultant, May 9, 2007. 
53 DHS, Management Directive Number 6300 (August 26, 2005). 
54 DHS, Management Directive Number 6300 (August 26, 2005). 
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The CAP organizes the projects to be reviewed by the CRG into three categories.  Category 1 
includes those projects that pose no compliance concern in the opinion of the analysts, CAP, and 
the office of General Counsel within the Science and Technology Directorate.  Essentially, this 
means the project did not trigger any of the NSABB criteria and no dual-use issues were 
identified.  These projects are described in a two or three paragraph summary in a read-ahead 
book. 
 
Category 2 projects are those that might reasonably raise perceptions of compliance concern, but 
do not trigger any NSABB criteria.  Those projects that pose significant dual-use issues, data 
generated on critical vulnerabilities, or those that involve studies of biological agent production 
or dissemination are included.  Such projects are summarized in a read-ahead book and also 
briefed to the CRG at the meeting. 
 
Category 3 projects are those that might reasonably raise the perception of a compliance issue by 
involving a NSABB “experiment of concern” criteria or involving types and quantities of 
biological agents that could raise questions about intent and purpose or experimental equipment, 
procedures, or activities that could raise questions about intent and purposes.  Such projects are 
briefed to the CRG by the Program Manager and Compliance Officer and require CRG member 
signatures. At any point, the CRG can classify a project.  
 
 
Issues for Consideration 
 
Research Methodology 
There are two major potential concerns over application of the PRA to the bioterrorist threat.  
First, it may not be appropriate for estimating terrorist motivation.  The PRA was largely 
designed to estimate and combine probabilities for mechanical systems – and therefore the 
outcomes of any particular intervention could be known with a high degree of confidence.  By 
contrast, estimates by even the most seasoned experts of terrorist group intentions and methods 
regarding BW inevitably involves a high degree of uncertainty.  Rather than using a PRA 
approach an estimating likelihood of every decision-making stage, it may be more useful to 
apply a game theoretical approach to this part of the Bioterrorism Threat Assessment.55   
 
Second, DHS has not run its model against known historical events.  It would be useful to know 
how well it compares with the past activities of the Aum Shinrikyo or Rajneesh cults in order to 
have greater confidence in it. 
 
In addition, the DHS model ranks agents according to estimates of severity of consequence.  
Integral to this assessment is some reasonably reliable model of the epidemiology of disease.  
For this, ever more precise estimates of lethal doses of agents (LD10 or even LD1) is said to be 
required.  There is at least some room to wonder whether such data (and the experiments 
required to generate that information) is really necessary: is our understanding of disease 








As discussed above, the scientific and legal oversight of DHS biodefense research is notable for 
the level of internal scrutiny involved.  Every program is reviewed and every PI must certify that 
there is no intention of violating the terms of the BWC.  In itself, this is tremendously 
commendable.  In addition, submitting the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology to an 
independent scientific review committee of the National Academies also ensures a greater degree 
of scientific rigor.  However, the NAS committee’s mandate is limited to an evaluation of the 
methodology itself and not the findings or conclusions.  Furthermore, there is some concern that 
while Batelle may develop a reasonable model, the significant benefits of doing so under a 
cooperative, open environment where every hypothesis can be tested is rebuffed.  That is, the 
Risk Assessment is likely to be sound, but perhaps not optimal. 
 
What is less clear about the oversight process is how the research requirements are generated 
from the risk assessment model.  This is important because in principle, many enhanced 
characteristics could be theoretically tested for its consequence, but not all are truly feasible.  
Furthermore, while advancements in science and technology may indicate potential avenues for 
enhancing agent properties, how likely is its actual application by a terrorist group?  The concern 
is that we will, by assuming that others perceive similar possibilities, push the technology in a 
way no one else has and thereby expand the threat space.  This was indeed the case during and 
after World War II. 
 
The lesson of the US BW program from 1942 – 1969 is that uncertainty prompts excessive 
reaction. If future directions are based on potential capabilities, this can lead to an exaggeration 
of the threat.   
 
Transparency  
There are processes in place that increase internal transparency – i.e. the government has a 
greater awareness of what kinds of research activities are being pursued.  However, that has not 
translated into a significant level of external transparency.  Those outside the government and the 
processes it created know little about what is being done, by whom, and with what purpose in 
mind. 
 
The highly-esteemed former Commander of USAMRIID, David Huxsoll, ran a very transparent 
medical research effort in the 1980s: 
 
An open, transparent biomedical defense program is the only type of program that truly 
supports US national policy, which is based on the provisions of the BWC.  If the 
medical defense program were shrouded by secrecy of any degree, it would be 
incompatible with program acceptance, execution, and accomplishment.  Selective 
openness is unacceptable:  being “open” or “transparent” implies access to information 
relating to all stages of the research and development cycle.  I also firmly believe that a 
laboratory of institute that can lay claim to internationally recognized scientific 
excellence has an open program.  Transparency is the responsibility of everyone who has 
any connection with the issues, either as part of his job, or as a consulting expert (whether 
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scientifically recognized or self-appointed).  In other words, transparency is everybody’s 
business.56 
 
The unclassified status allowed foreign scientists to work at USAMRIID and also for US 
researchers to cooperate on international projects to test new therapies and vaccines that aided 
both foreign countries where diseases were endemic and the US biodefense research program. A 
few examples are noted below:57 
 
 A new vaccine for Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever was developed under a UN 
Development project, jointly conducted by USAMRIID and Argentine 
investigators.  The live, attenuated Junin vaccine was taken to final product in 
1982 in compliance with vaccine requirements for the US and Argentina.  
Researchers also tested ribavirin, an antiviral, in a field trial against AHF. 
 During outbreaks of Lassa fever in Liberia in the late 1980s, human immune 
plasma was harvested from recovering patients and used to treat infected ones.  In 
the process, USAMRIID collected several hundred high-quality Lassa-immune 
plasma units for future treatment of the disease. 
 USAMRIID leadership in filovirus research and international collaboration led to 
a “comprehensive, collaborative research program organized with the Institut 
Pasteur and implemented in the Central African Republic.  The innovative 
international program, a pioneering first, allowed previously separate and 
independent laboratory and field efforts to be combined, closely integrated, and 
efficiently focused on Ebola and Marburg viruses.”58 
 
It is difficult to imagine USAMRIID scientists being given permission by foreign governments 
such as China to administer experimental US drugs to their citizens if those drugs came out of a 
classified US biodefense program.  It is not even possible to imagine non-US citizens from 
certain countries being allowed to work within the US biodefense program today after the 
restrictions imposed by the PATRIOT act on researchers and international collaborations. 
 
This decision to keep all work under the BDRP unclassified came despite the 1979 Sverdlovsk 
anthrax release, reports of deaths from T-2 mycotoxins in Southeast Asia, and other reports 
indicating the existence of biological weapons programs in other states. Therefore, in the midst 
of revelations of an evolving threat, a deliberate choice was made to operate the US Biodefense 





The U.S. government created the NBACC to better understand – and develop countermeasures to 
– biological threats to the US homeland.  Can a state with advanced capabilities and a past 
                                                            
56 David L. Huxsoll, “Narrowing the Zone of Uncertainty between Research and Development in Biological Warfare 
Defense,” in Raymond A. Zilinskas, ed., The Microbioilogist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics, 
and International Security (New York: The New York Academy of Sciences, 1992): 177-191. 
57 See Okutani, Structuring Biodefense, 116-117. 
58 Commander’s Forward, USAMRIID, Annual Progress Report FY1986 (Frederick, MD: USAMRIID), ix-x. 
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offensive program credibly perform secret biodefense work without generating adverse and 
competitive reactions among other states – and emulation by aggressive non-state groups?  This 
is a fundamental question because the threats the US will face – and must therefore prepare for – 
will likely share the essential features of those generated by biological weapons: dual-use, widely 
available materials and methods that can be used for mass destruction by small groups or 
possibly even individuals. 
 
For those concerned with national security and foreign policy, there are few more pressing issues 
than this, as both the conceptual and operational practices required to meet asymmetric threats to 
the US must develop at a pace commensurate with the evolving danger.  One path forward is to 
examine whether reassurance about the non-aggressive nature of a state’s activities is possible 
when preparing defenses.  As a theoretical construct, reassurance is not well-understood nor 
well-defined.  It is likely, however, that it will prove fundamental to our future security.   
 
To prevent actors from crimes that cannot be punished – and therefore from which they cannot 
be credibly deterred – the US must not rely solely on being better prepared to respond and ever 
more vigilant.  To do so is inherently impractical.  Rather, the US must begin finding new ways 
to both provide reassurance to other states and to be reassured where trust is warranted.  Doing 
this may require building innovative networks built on transparency and regular signaling.  If the 
US can work actively in this way, it may be able to both delve deeper into the activities of groups 




Appendix 1:  CWC and BWC Compliance 
Project Summary – Template 
 
 Project Title, 
 Project Rationale.  Please provide a clear statement regarding why the project needs to be 
undertaken (e.g. describe the specific foreign threat or technological capability that it is 
intended to understand, counter, etc., and/or the U.S. vulnerability it is intended to overcome, 
and whether it is based on any specific open source or intelligence information). 
 Its objective (e.g. to determine, to develop, to improve, to better understand, to support 
development of, etc.) 
 A brief description of the scientific/technical approach, 
 Status (underway on-hold, completed), 
 The names of any toxic chemicals*, biological select agents and toxins (as defined by 42 
CFR §73.3 and §73.4), or novel reagents used in the project, 
o A statement regarding precise quantities (for chemicals and toxins only) 
o The method of production (e.g. laboratory quantities produced in cultures, etc.) or 
where they were obtained, and 
o Their disposition (e.g. consumed by experimentation, archived, 
decontamination/destroyed etc.) 
 
 The types, quantities and disposition of any dissemination means (spraying devices, vectors, 
etc.) used in the project, as well as the rationale for their use. 
*As defined in Article II of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm 
to humans or animals.  This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their 
method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or 





Appendix 2: Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Checklist 
Section 1: BWC Screening Criteria 
 
NSABB Criteria for Identifying Dual Use Research of Concern (July 2006 draft) 
Is the project intended to enhance the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin. 
Is the project intended to disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization without 
clinical and/or agricultural justification? 
Is the project intended to confer to a biological agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or 
agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent toxin, or 
facilitate their ability to evade… 
Is the project intended to increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a 
biological agent or toxin? 
Is the project intended to alter the host range or tropism of a biological agent or toxin?  
Is the project intended to enhance the susceptibility of a host population? 
Is the project intended to generate a novel pathogenic agent or toxin, or reconstitute an eradicated 
or extinct biological agent? 
 
Agents 
Does or will the project involve work with biological select agents or toxins? 
Does or will the project involve the generation or use of recombinant or synthetic DNA? 
 
Intent 
Is or will the project be involved in any way with the development, production, stockpiling, 
transfer, acquisition, retention or possession of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system 
for use as a weapon? 
Does or will the project involve the transfer or weapons, equipment of means of delivery for BW 
agents or toxins? 
 
Facilities and Equipment 
Does or will the project include the use of a high or maximum biosafety containment laboratory 
(BL-3 or BL-4 lab)? 
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Does or will the project include the use of bioreactors or fermentors? If so, please describe the 
use in the Project Summary. 
Does or will the project include the use of an aerosol test chamber?  If so, please describe the use 
in the Project Summary. 
Are any dissemination means (e.g. spraying devices, vectors, etc.) included in the project?  If so, 
please describe the types, quantity and rationale for their use in the Project Summary. 
 
Purpose 
Does or will the project involve laboratory research for biological agent threat characterization 
and/or trials for countermeasures against such agents? 
Does or will the project involve paper studies or modeling, without laboratory research on agents 
or toxins? 
Does or will the project involve the development of biological agent detection or surveillance 
systems? 
Does or will the project involve developing decontamination means? 
Does or will the project involve the development of individual or collective protection systems? 
Does or will the project involve the creation of vaccines or other medical countermeasures for 
humans/animals? 
Does or will the project involve the use of microorganisms for the prevention of disease in 
humans or animals, for diagnostic reagents, or for use with biocontrol agents or plant 
inoculants? 
 
